Dallas’s Fourth-Down Choices in Green Bay Were Reasonable—Until Execution Disappeared

Fourth down did not betray Dallas in Green Bay. It merely refused to rescue an offense that kept asking difficult questions of itself.

The Cowboys went 2-for-4 on fourth down as Green Bay beat Dallas 23-13 Sunday night, but that summary is too blunt to judge the choices fairly. Three situations deserve separate treatment: CeeDee Lamb’s third-quarter conversion, a failed attempt at midfield and a fourth-and-11 stop near the goal line. The decisions were shaped by score, distance, field position and time.

The result of each play matters, but it is not the whole probability analysis.

One conversion helped produce a touchdown; two subsequent failures left Dallas chasing a game with increasingly little time. They merit separate judgments.

The conversion that earned its keep

Trailing 17-0 early in the third quarter, Dallas faced fourth-and-2 from the Packers 38. Prescott found Lamb over the middle, and the receiver gained 17 yards to Green Bay’s 21.

That decision made sense in context. A field goal would have reduced the deficit only to 14, and Dallas needed a touchdown drive to make the game structurally competitive. The offense had started at Green Bay’s 46 and moved eight yards closer, creating a short-yardage choice in Packers territory.

The call gave Dallas a chance to keep control of the possession rather than hope the defense could manufacture a quick change.

The catch alone did not create the touchdown. Javonte Williams gained 4 yards and Spann-Ford added a 6-yard catch. Williams then ran for 8 and 2 yards before scoring from the 1. That nine-play, 46-yard drive worked because Dallas handled the next five snaps after Lamb’s catch. Fourth-down success opened the door; execution walked through it.

The midfield attempt needed more than courage

The second decision came early in the fourth quarter. Dallas had moved to midfield, but an incompletion on third down left the offense needing 2 yards. Prescott threw toward Lamb again, and Javon Bullard broke up the pass.

Going for it was defensible with Green Bay ahead 20-7. Dallas needed points, and punting would have surrendered possession without solving the two-score problem. But the choice was hardly self-justifying.

Green Bay’s pressure was a persistent difficulty. Across the full game, Prescott took seven hits, although the Packers recorded just one sack. A short fourth down still required the Cowboys to win one snap against a defense making the passing game operate in small pieces.

They did not. Green Bay then drove 38 yards in nine plays for Trey Smack’s 29-yard field goal, pushing the margin to 23-7. The failure did not make the decision automatically wrong; it made the cost of incomplete execution plain. Dallas needed continuation and got none.

Fourth-and-11 was a different animal

The final attempt came with about five minutes remaining, after Dallas had driven 57 yards in 14 plays. From the Packers 13, a sack pushed Dallas back to the 16. An incompletion and a 2-yard completion to Hunter Luepke then left fourth-and-11 at the 14.

That was no longer a compact short-yardage gamble. Dallas needed the conversion, yet the distance left little room for a routine answer, and the offense had already spent several snaps in the scoring area without reaching the end zone. Prescott’s short middle pass to Lamb fell incomplete.

This is where blanket criticism of aggression misses the point. A fourth-and-11 try while trailing by 16 is not comparable to fourth-and-2 while down two touchdowns. The former reflects desperation created by the score and the preceding series; it does not prove the latter was misguided.

Ryan Flournoy’s touchdown catch on the next Dallas scoring drive made the final margin look less severe, but the two-point attempt failed and the Cowboys had no meaningful possession afterward. Dallas finished with 303 yards, 48 rushing yards and 54 pass attempts, numbers that left very little cushion for failed conversions or empty red-zone trips.

Lamb’s conversion supplied the opening for Dallas’ first touchdown. At midfield and at the Packers 14, the later attempts supplied no continuation at all. Those situations required different decisions, but each ultimately depended on winning the next snap. A coach can choose to keep the offense on the field. The offense still has to justify the choice.

Sources

Dallas Cowboys: team reporting

Green Bay Packers: official reporting

Dallas Cowboys: team reporting

Dallas Cowboys: team reporting

ESPN: box score and play-by-play